Selected Research

The list below is a selection of representative recent research projects. You can find an exhaustive list of my projects in my CV.

In this project, I address the semantics and pragmatics of shall as it is used in legal texts, with special attention given to explaining the range of interpretations the modal receives and the relative prominence of shall in legal writing. I propose a unified, semantic mimalist account in which shall has a simple Kratzerian semantics. The high usage of shall in law is argued to be motivated by socio-pragmatic pressures to make legal language sound maximally authoritative.

The socio-pragmatic function of linguistic complexity in the domain of law

Where human language usage is broadly shaped by a tendency toward efficiency, the legal domain presents a case where linguistic inefficiency predominates. We argue that there is a sociopragmatic reason for the complexity of statutory law. We demonstrate empirically that there is a relationship between linguistic complexity and perceived authoritativeness.

The linguistic injustice of textualism

In this paper building on Andrei Marmor’s “The Immorality of Textualism” (2005), I discuss the linguistic justice of the approach to interpretation. As textualism has risen to pre-eminence in the federal judiciary in the decades since Marmor’s article was initially published, several of the author’s predictions have come to be realized. Emphasizing actual implementations of textualism rather than idealized descriptions, I argue that textualist approaches regularly and intrinsically instantiate linguistic injustice.

Linguistics at the Supreme Court: Current Challenges and Potential Solutions

In this paper I find Supreme Court engagement with amicus briefs filed by linguists is quite limited. I argue that misunderstanding of linguistics, the nature of nongovernmental amicus filings, and the division of factual and legal issues contribute to this lack of engagement. As a means of improving engagement with linguists in the legal profession, I propose that linguists should turn toward partnerships with the legal academy.

Facts, Law, and Ordinary Meaning: Linguistics in the Interpretive Domain

This project addresses the tension that emerges from the treatment of ordinary meaning in law as an empirical issue. I argue that the fact-law division functions to exclude the contributions of linguists on interpretive matters, even when their work is relevant to the issue at hand. The interpretation of the law has long been (rightly) understood to be a legal issue. However, when empirical considerations become central to interpretation, the fact-law distinction becomes a barrier to effective collaboration between linguists and legal professionals in interpretive matters.

Unordinary Meaning: Statutory Interpretation as a Domain of Sociolinguistic Inquiry

In the interpretation of the law, judges often pursue descriptive linguistic analysis by seeking to identify the “ordinary meaning” of a statutory provision. The issue of variation in relation to ordinary meaning, however, has received almost no attention. In this project, I argue that sociolinguistic considerations such as how cultural norms and communities of practice are highly relevant to contemporary legal interpretation.